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Abstract
In situations where explicit communication is lim-
ited, a human collaborator is typically able to
learn to: (i) infer the meaning behind their part-
ner’s actions and (ii) balance between taking ac-
tions that are exploitative given their current un-
derstanding of the state vs. those that can con-
vey private information about the state to their
partner. The first component of this learning pro-
cess has been well-studied in multi-agent systems,
whereas the second — which is equally crucial
for a successful collaboration — has not. In this
work, we complete the learning process and intro-
duce our novel algorithm, Policy Belief Learning
(“PBL”), which mimics both components men-
tioned above. A belief module models the other
agent’s private information by observing their ac-
tions, whilst a policy module makes use of the
inferred private information to return a distribu-
tion over actions. They are mutually reinforced
with each other and iteratively learned. We use a
novel auxiliary reward to encourage information
exchange by actions. We evaluate our approach
on the non-competitive bidding problem from con-
tract bridge and show that by self-play agents are
able to effectively collaborate with implicit com-
munication, and PBL outperforms several mean-
ingful baselines that have been considered.
1. Introduction
Communication is fundamental in collaborative multi-agent
systems so that agents can learn to interact as a collective, as
opposed to a collection of individuals. This is particularly
important in the imperfect-information setting, where parts
of the state that are hidden in one party’s partial view of
the world — but observable by others — may be critical to
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their success. This motivates the need for a communication
protocol between agents, so that private information can be
exchanged, participants can learn more about the true state
of the world, and actions can be taken to coordinate joint
activity.
Typically in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL),
we facilitate inter-agent communication by incorporating an
explicit communication channel. This is conceptually simi-
lar to language, or verbal communication which is known
to be important for maintaining mutual understanding in
human social interaction (Baker et al., 1999). Explicit com-
munication channels come at a cost (Roth et al., 2006),
however, and can be difficult to employ in the case of de-
centralized control. Moreover, in some games (e.g. bridge,
Hanabi) and real-world applications (e.g. driving, storage
robots coordination, team sports) explicit communication
is either very limited or not efficient. In these situations,
humans are effective in learning to infer the meaning from
others’ actions implicitly (Heider & Simmel, 1944) and rely-
ing upon implicit communication as a means of information
exchange (Rasouli et al., 2017).
Previous works have considered ways in which an agent
can build a model of opponents’ characteristics, objectives
or hidden information by observing their behavior either
implicitly (He et al., 2016; Bard et al., 2013; Bjarnason &
Peterson, 2002) or explicitly (Raileanu et al., 2018; Lockett
et al., 2007; Hernandez-Leal & Kaisers, 2017; Li & Mi-
ikkulainen, 2018). Whilst these works are of great value,
they overlook the fact that an agent should also consider
that it is being modeled and adapt its behavior accordingly,
which is the principle of the theory of mind (Premack &
Woodruff, 1978). For example in collaborative tasks, an
agent could choose to take actions which are informative
to its teammates, whereas, in competitive situations, agents
might benefit from acting in a way that limits others’ ability
to model them. Our work combines modeling of others,
with a policy that also considers it is being modeled. In this
work, we use the word ”opponent” when referring to another
agent in the environment irrespective of the environment’s
cooperative or adversarial nature. Also, we interchangeably
use the words ”hidden information” and ”private informa-
tion” of one agent to refer the information only observable
to that agent but not others.
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Our proposed Policy Belief Learning (PBL) is a general
framework for learning to cooperate in imperfect informa-
tion multi-agent games. PBL consists of a belief module,
modeling other agents’ private information by considering
their previous actions, and a policy module, combining the
agent’s current observation with the inferred hidden informa-
tion to return a distribution over actions. The two modules
are trained iteratively: at each PBL iteration, the belief
module learns to infer the meaning behind others’ actions
accurately, and the policy module learns to take more infor-
mative actions (without compromising overall performance
in the game). We first present the algorithm Policy-Belief-
Iteration (P-BIT) with convergence proof in our framework
and then we introduce PBL, an approximation of P-BIT
which is practical to implement in complex problems.
We evaluate PBL by considering the non-competitive bid-
ding challenge from contract bridge. Our experiment shows
that agents trained using PBL can learn collaborative behav-
iors more effectively than a number of meaningful baselines
without any explicit communication.
2. Related Work
2.1. Multi-agent Communication and Agent Modeling
The capability of reasoning about opponents’ private infor-
mation, strategies and other characteristics is crucial when
one’s reward is also affected by actions of its opponents
(Albrecht & Stone, 2017). This reasoning process, defined
as opponent modeling in MARL, has broad applicability in
different fields such as human-robot interactions (Vemula
et al., 2017; Bai et al., 2015), security (Borck et al., 2015;
Jarvis et al., 2004) , education (Iida et al., 1995) and en-
tertainment (Schadd et al., 2007). Opponent modeling has
a long history which dates back to the ”fictitious play” in
Game Theory where an agent estimates its opponent’s strat-
egy from past experience and use this estimation to choose
its best response in future (Brown, 1951). Following this
work, a great number of algorithms have been devised to
solve Nash Equilibrium with different forms of opponent
modeling (Littman, 1994; Hu & Wellman, 1998; Claus &
Boutilier, 1998; Hu & Wellman, 2003; Greenwald & Hall,
2003).
Equipped with rich representation power of Neural Net-
works (NNs), recent works have obtained some progress
in opponent modeling. It is shown empirically that using
opponents’ features implicitly in one’s decision process
parameterized by an NN improves the performance of a
trained agent (He et al., 2016). To solve the notorious non-
stationarity caused by other learning agents in MARL, the
idea of modeling opponents’ learning process is proposed
in (Foerster et al., 2017). The ability of modeling different
types of opponents is important in real human society, and
some initial research has been conducted in (Rabinowitz
et al., 2018). Our work is closely related to (Lowe et al.,
2017; Albrecht & Stone, 2017; Mealing & Shapiro, 2017;
Raileanu et al., 2018) where an agent builds models to esti-
mate other agents’ hidden information. However, our work
enhances a “flat” opponent model with recursive reason-
ing. “Flat” implies the opponent model only estimates the
hidden information of opponents, which can be seen as
a part of the unobservable environment states. Recursive
reasoning requires making decisions base on the environ-
ment states and mental states of others. In contrast to works
such as I-POMDP (Gmytrasiewicz & Doshi, 2005) and PR2
(Wen et al., 2019) where the nested belief is embedded into
the training agent’s opponent model, we implement level-1
nested belief “I believe that you believe” by a novel auxiliary
reward when we train a policy.
Recently there has also been a surge of interest in using
reinforcement learning (RL) approaches to learn communi-
cation protocols (Foerster et al., 2016; Mordatch & Abbeel,
2017; Sukhbaatar et al., 2016; Lazaridou et al., 2016). Most
of these works enable agents to communicate by using an
explicit discrete/continuous channel. Mordatch and Abbeel
(2017) observe the emergence of non-verbal communication
in collaborative environments without an explicit communi-
cation channel, where agents can only be either a sender or
receiver in their setting. Similar research is also conducted
in (de Weerd et al., 2015). However, we do not have this
restriction in our setting, which makes the problem more
difficult. Knepper et al. (2017) proposes a framework of
implicit communication in a cooperative setting and shows
that various problems can be mapped into this framework.
Although our work is conceptually close to (Knepper et al.,
2017), we go beyond this and present a practical algorithm
for training agents. A recent work focuses on sovling a
similar problem to the one in our paper is done in (Foerster
et al., 2018), where a public player is trained to choose a
deterministic policy for real players in a game based on
publicly observable information. Though an informative
policy should by nature have low entropy but a deterministic
policy cannot be used to solve ambiguities. In our work, we
do not assume the policy is deterministic. A similar aux-
iliary reward to our communication reward was proposed
in (Strouse et al., 2018). However, our model can further
improve the performance of communication by actions by
an iterative training style between the policy and belief mod-
ules. This could be hard to achieve in (Strouse et al., 2018)
where the auxiliary reward is computed independent of the
opponent’s belief.
Our work lies in an interesting overlapping region of agent
modeling and multi-agent communication. A distinguishing
factor of our work to previous ones in multi-agent commu-
nication is that we do not have an explicit communication
channel and information exchange can only happen through
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actions, i.e. implicit communication by actions. Therefore,
an agent needs to build a belief model of its opponents’ pri-
vate information and learn to convey information to others
by actions. To our knowledge, our work is the first one to
combine opponent modeling and implicit communication
to solve a cooperative problem by deep RL.
2.2. Computerized Bridge Program
In this paper, we focus on the bidding problem in com-
puterized bridge card program as a case study. Imitation
learning has been used in learning human bidding systems
(B.Yegnanarayana et al., 1996; DeLooze & Downey, 2007).
It has been shown that lookahead search can be improved
by borrowing rules from human bidding systems (Gamback
et al., 1993; Ginsberg, 1999). A decision tree model PIDM
(Partial Information Decision Making) using Monte Carlo
sampling to predict bids and pruning the tree with a learned
refine strategy is proposed in (Amit & Markovitch, 2006),
which leads to further improvement. Ho and Lin (2015)
build a decision tree model with the contextual bandit al-
gorithm. They learn a bidding model without reference to
rules designed by human experts. However, their model
is limited to bid from up to 5 options and a hand-crafted
feature representation is used to facilitate the learning. Most
recent works have achieved some promising results but their
successes all rely on human expert knowledge. The first
work to learn a bidding system without direct human domain
knowledge is in (Yeh & Lin, 2016), where they propose an
algorithm which learns a Q-function at each step of bidding.
However, the success is mixed with unfair training tricks
and the compromise of generality.
3. Method
3.1. Multi-Agent POMDP
We frame our problem as a cooperative partially observable
Markov game. A Markov game for N agents defines as a
tuple (S,A,O, T ,R, p, γ), where S is a set of environment
states, O is a set of partial observations for each agent
O = {O1, ...,ON}, and Ai ∈ A = {A1, ...,AN} is the
action set of agent i. The partial observation of each agent
is given by a probabilistic function: S 7→ Oi. Initial states
are determined by a distribution p1 : S 7→ [0, 1]. State
transitions are determined by a function T : S ×A1× . . .×
AN 7→ S. For each agent i, a reward is given by function
ri : S × A1 × . . . × AN 7→ R, To choose actions, each
agent i uses a stochastic policy pii : Oi ×Ai 7→ [0, 1].
In this paper, we restrict the discussion in the setting where
there are only two agents, i.e. N = 2. The same derivation
holds for arbitrary numbers of agents. We use a compact
representation −i to refer to all the complementary agents
of agent i in a game. We assume that agents share the same
action space and observation space, and they act according
to the same policy pi and receive a shared reward. The
objective is to find a policy that maximizes the expected
shared return, which can be solved as a joint maximization
problem:
max
pi
J (pi), where J (pi) = Epi
[∑
t
γtr
(
st, a
i
t, a
−i
t
) ]
,
where st is the current state and (ait, a
−i
t ) are joint actions
taken by agent i and all other agents respectively at time t
and γ is a discount factor. We note that this setting could be
formalized as a Dec-POMDP (Bernstein et al., 2013).
We denote the discounted state distribution as ρpis′ =∑
s
∑T
t=1 γ
tp1(s)p(s → s′, t, pi) where p(s → s′, t, pi) is
the probability of being at state s′ after transitioning for t
time steps from state s (Sutton & Barto, 1998). Then we
can rewrite the objective as:
J (pi)
=
∑
s
ρpis
∑
ai,a−i
pi
(
ait|o1t
)
pi
(
a−it |o2t
)
r(st, a
i
t, a
−i
t ),
= Es∼ρpis ,ai,a−i∼pi
[
r(st, a
i
t, a
−i
t )
]
, (1)
where Es∼ρpis denotes the expected value with respect to dis-
counted state distribution ρpis . In particular, despite the fact
that ρpis depends on the policy parameters, the policy gradi-
ent does not depend on the gradient of the state distribution
(Sutton & Barto, 1998).
3.2. Implicit Communication Environment
We define an implicit communication environment where
each agent’s observation, oit = {hit, xit}, consists of its op-
ponent’s actions history hit and its own private information
hidden to others xit, where h
i
t = {a−i0 , . . . , a−it−1}. The
private information xit is constant over time and given to
agent i at the beginning of the game. At each time step
t, the constant private information of all agents is part of
the environment state x = (xi, x−i) ∈ st. To succeed in a
partially observable environment, agent i maintains a belief
module to infer x−i through its observed history of actions
hi. We denote agent i’s belief about the set of its opponent’s
private information x−i as bit.
3.3. Policy Belief Iteration
Solving reinforcement learning as an inference problem has
a long history, which dates back to (Kalman, 1960) where
the Kalman smoothing is used to solve optimal control in lin-
ear dynamics with quadratic cost and has been well studied
in (Levine & Koltun, 2013; Vlassis et al., 2009; Kober & Pe-
ters, 2009; Abdolmaleki et al., 2018; Levine & Koltun, 2013;
Furmston & Barber, 2010). Following their approaches, we
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reformulate our optimization objective in Eq. (1) as an infer-
ence problem, by introducing a binary random variableEt at
time step t that serves as the indicator for ”optimality”. We
know that the reward rt is bounded at each time step. But the
maximum reward that the agent can obtain given the state st
and joint actions (ait, a
−i
t ) is unknown. So it is reasonable
to assume P (Et = 1|st, ait, a−it ) ∝ exp(R(st, ait, a−it )).
This assumption means that if the higher reward is obtained
at time t, it is more likely for the agent to achieve the ”op-
timality”, denoted by Et = 1. Then, the original objective
in Eq. (1) can be rewritten as the maximum likelihood of
achieving ”optimality” in each time step given the policy,
max L(pi) ∆= logP (E1:T |pi). (2)
By treating opponent’s private information x−i as a latent
variable and using a variational distribution q, we derive a
lower bound of log likelihood L(pi) as:
L(pi) ≥F(Φ, pi) (3)
∆
=
∑
t
Eρs,pi,Φ[r(st, ait, a
−i
t )
−DKL(Φi(x−it |hit)||P (x−it |st))
−DKL(Φ−i(xit|h−it )||P (xit|st))], (4)
where Φ = (Φi(x−it |hit),Φ−i(xit|h−it )) and pi = (pii, pi−i).
The detailed derivation of lower bound of F(Φ, pi) is shown
in the Appendix B. As we assume the hidden information is
constant over time and given in the beginning of the game,
we will drop the subscript t of xt henceforth.
To optimize this lower bound F(Φ, pi), we propose an iter-
ative training algorithm Policy Belief Iteration (P-BIT). At
each iteration v, in the Belief Iteration, we set:
Eρs,piv−1 [Φiv(x−i|hit)] = Eρs,piv−1 [P (x−i)], (5)
Eρs,piv−1 [Φ−iv (xi|h−it )] = Eρs,piv−1 [P (xi)],
given piv−1 being fixed. Recall that h is the actions history
which is sampled from ρs × pi, therefore, the equality signs
above are achieved under the expectation with respect to ρs
and pi. Note, at time step t, as agent i receives a new obser-
vation hit = {hit−1, a−it−1}, so Φiv(x−i|hit) can be different
from Φiv(x
−i|hit−1).
In the Policy Iteration, we set:
piiv = arg max
pii
∑
t
Eρs,pi,Φv [r(st, ait, a
−i
t )
−DKL(Φ−iv (xi|h−it )||P (xi))], (6)
pi−iv = arg max
pi−i
∑
t
Eρs,pi,Φv [r(st, ait, a
−i
t )
−DKL(Φiv(x−i|hit)||P (x−i)),
given Φv being fixed. Recall h−it = {ai0, . . . , ait−1}, which
is a series of actions sampled from agent i’s policy pii. There-
fore, we distribute DKL(Φ−iv (x
i|h−it )||P (xi)) to the objec-
tive for pii. This implies that the Policy Iteration for agent i
not only maximizes the expected return but also minimizes
the KL divergence between its opponent’s estimated un-
observable information Φ−iv (x
i|h−it ) and the ground truth
P (xi). Namely, how good your opponent can model about
you partly depends on how informative your policy is.
The P-BIT is effectively an Expectation-Maximization algo-
rithm, where the Belief Iteration and Policy Iteration can be
seen as the E-step and M-step respectively. Then it is easy
to show that P-BIT can monotonically improve the lower
bound F(q, pi) with the identity:
L(piv−1) = F(Φv, piv−1) ≤ F(Φv, piv) ≤ L(piv), (7)
where the first equality symbol follows from the Belief
Iteration, i.e. the E-step. The following less-than-or-equal-
to symbols result from the Policy Iteration (M-step) and
Jensen Inequality. Following (Neal & Hinton, 1999), we
can show P-BIT converges to a (local) maximum in L(pi∗).
We can re-express the log likelihood objective and lower
bound as L(θ) and F(Φ, θ) respectively, where we parame-
terize the policy piθ with θ ∈ Θ. Then we have:
Lemma 1. Let θ∗ be a fixed point of P-BIT, then θ∗ is a
stationary point in L(θ).
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
From Lemma 1, we see that P-BIT can converge to a sta-
tionary point in L(θ). Next we can show that:
Theorem 1. If F(Φ∗, θ∗) has a (local) maximum at Φ∗ and
θ∗, then L(θ∗) also has a (local) maximum at θ∗.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The full Policy Belief Iteration (P-BIT) algorithms alternates
between the Belief Iteration and Policy Iteration. Although
this algorithm will provably converge to the optimal pi∗ and
Φ∗, it can be performed in exact form only in the tabular
case. In large state and action spaces, the procedures de-
fined in Belief and Policy Iteration in Eq. 5 and 6 become
intractable.
3.4. Policy Belief Learning
In this section, we present a practical algorithm Policy Belief
Learning (PBL) which is an approximate version of P-BIT
and uses a finite set of samples from the environment. We
first parameterize the auxiliary distribution Φθb(x|ht) with
θb and name it the belief module. In our model, agent i
models its unseen information x−i at time step t by using
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Φθb , which only takes the history of its opponent’s actions
hit as input and outputs its belief b
i
t, which is a distribution
of x−i,
bit = Φθb(x
−i|hit) = Pr(x−i|hit).
In addition, agent i has a parameterized policy module piθp
to choose actions, which takes its private information xi
and belief bit as inputs and outputs a distribution over legal
actions
piθp(a
i
t|xi, bit) = Pr(ait|xi, bit).
We adopt the notion of centralized training and decentral-
ized execution: all agents are treated as one single agent
with different observations. Therefore Φiθb(x
−i|hit) and
Φ−iθb (x
i|h−it ) are parameterized with the same parameters
θb but have different inputs (hit and h
−i
t respectively). Simi-
larly, piiθp(a
i
t|xi, bit) and pi−iθp (a−it |x−i, b−it ) share the same
parameters θp. In the following part, we will discuss the
learning procedure for agent i only.
We first present how Belief Iteration from P-BIT can be
approximated. In Belief Learning at iteration v, as can been
seen from Eq (5), to make the bound tight, we need to set:
Eρs,piv−1 [Φiv(x−i|hit)] = Eρs,piv−1 [P (x−i)]
= Eρ,piv−1 [x−i], (8)
where the second equality comes from the fact that agent
i’s unobservable information is its opponent’s hidden infor-
mation: x−i, which can be revealed during the centralized
training. In practice, however, when the hidden information
space is too large, we cannot evaluate Φi(x−i|hit) for each
x−i ∈ X in discrete case or have the analytical form in
continuous case. To solve that, by noticing the optimization
is expressed in an expectation form, we can do stochastic
optimization in Belief Learning and draw samples from
ρ × piv−1. We generate a dataset Ωv = {(x−i, hi)Mm } by
self-play. To make Φθb(x
−i|hi) closer to x−i, we minimize
the KL-divergence with respect to θb as:
θb := arg min
θb
E(x−i,hi)∼Ωv−1
[DKL(Φθb(x−i|hi)||x−i)].
(9)
We show how Policy Iteration from P-BIT is approximated
by an on-policy algorithm in the rest of this section. In
Policy Learning at iteration v, we need to solve the maxi-
mization problem defined in Eq. 6:
piiv = arg max
pii
∑
t
Eρs,pi,Φv [r(st, ait, a
−i
t )
−DKL(Φ−iv (xi|h−it )||xi)]. (10)
The maximization of expected return is a standard problem
and could be solved with many algorithms in RL. To find a
new policy piv which minimizes the KL divergence between
π0 ɸ0v = 0
v = T
Ω0
π1 ɸ1v = 1 Ω1
πT
Self Play
Self Play
SL
SL
PG
PG
Figure 1. PBL training process.
Φ−iv (x
i
t|h−it ) and xi, we introduce a novel auxiliary reward,
which encourages agents to convey hidden information to
others, i.e. implicit communication by actions.
With the knowledge of others holding belief about agent i’s
private information xi, agent i could review how informative
its action is to others by investigating how much closer its
opponent’s belief b−i is to its private information xi before
and after that action. To build a better shared understanding,
that agent can use this information from past experience to
help it make actions more informative in future. Inspired by
this idea, for agent i’s actions at time step t, we set:
ric,t = DKL(b−it ||xi)−DKL(b−it+1||xi). (11)
For each time step, one agent receives a positive communi-
cation reward ric,t if its action a
i
t can make its opponent’s
belief b−it+1 closer to the ground truth than the opponent’s be-
lief b−it before observing action a
i
t. Then in Policy Learning,
we can train a policy by algorithms from policy gradient
family with:
r = αrc + re,
where re is environment reward and α ≥ 0 balances be-
tween communication and environment reward.
For agent i, the communication reward encourages it
to find a policy which leads to increasingly smaller
KL divergence DKL
(
Φ−iv (x
−i|ht)||xi
)
over time. Then
it is easy to see that this auxiliary reward can help
training agents to find a policy which minimizes∑
t Eρs,pi,Φ
[
DKL(Φ
−i
v (x
i|h−it )||xit)] as defined in Eq. 6.
In practical implementation, we modify ric,t slightly as:
ric,t = DKL(b−i∗||xi)−DKL(b−it+1||xi), (12)
where b−i∗ is agent −i’s best belief so far about agent i’s
private information, which leads to better performance in
the experiment.
In the training stage, information is leaked by gradient up-
date and by using the ground truth as training targets for the
belief module during the training. In the test stage however,
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even though players use the same trained network, their own
private information remains hidden and there is no gradient
update.
At first PBL iteration v = 0 , we train a naive policy to make
actions without considering the existence of other agents.
Then we can iterate between Belief learning and Policy
learning till either we run out of computing resources or
the policy and belief modules converge. Fig. 3 in Appendix
D demonstrates how two agents interact with each other
using policy and belief modules. Fig. 1 shows the process
of training PBL. See Appendix A for the pseudo-code of
PBL.
4. Experiment
4.1. Contract Bridge
In this paper, we implement PBL for non-competitive con-
tact bridge bidding, which is an imperfect information fully
cooperative game. It requires agents to exchange informa-
tion through actions in order to decide a good contract.
Contract bridge, or bridge, is a trick-taking game using a
standard 52-card deck with four players North, East, South
& West (henceforth N/E/S/W). The players are split into
two teams, such that the players from each team are sat
physically opposite to one another (i.e. Team 1: N/S, Team
2: E/W). Following the deal, there are bidding and playing
phases.
In bidding, players bid for a contract sequentially till a
proposed one is agreed, which is normally called the final
contract. A PASS bid makes no change to the previously pro-
posed contract and a contract is agreed only if it is followed
by 3 PASS bids. A non-PASS bid proposes a new contract
and is in the form of L,K where L is an integer ranging
from 1 to 7 and K can be one of K = {♣,♦,♥,♠, NT}.
6 +L is the number of tricks needed to achieve the contract
and K represents the trump suit where NT stands for no
trump suit. In each deal, points are assigned to the contract
declaring team if they fulfill the contract otherwise to the
other team (”defender”). Bidding must be non-decreasing
which means L is non-decreasing and must go up if the
newly proposed trump suit comes before the one from the
previous round of bidding in the above set K by order:
♣ < ♦ < ♥ < ♠ < NT .
Bridge is a great challenge for AI mainly because of its
imperfect information feature. In bridge, one player has nei-
ther perfect information about its opponent nor its partner.
The best chance for a team to exchange key information is
in the bidding phase. Professional human players normally
have a highly delicate bidding system, which is effectively a
pre-designed implicit communication protocol for exchang-
ing information. However, ambiguity can still exist in a
system. Human players need to solve this ambiguity with
their intelligence and experience. Nonetheless, this is ex-
tremely hard for an AI agent to do so because bidding has
strict rules to follow so information that can be delivered is
limited. In addition, as the final contract greatly affects the
result of the game, a player needs to make a good balance
between information exchange and proposing a good final
contract to win the game. Hence, bidding in bridge will be
an appropriate and challenging test bed for PBL.
4.2. Problem Setup
In this work, we focus on bidding in bridge without compe-
tition where we have Player N and Player S bidding in the
game, but Player W and E always bid PASS. In this setting,
the declaring team will never change and thus each deal
can be viewed as an independent episode of a game. The
private information of Player i xi, i ∈ {N,S} to others is
its hand. xi is a 52-dimension one-hot vector encoding its
13 cards. One agent’s observation at time step t consists of
its hand and the game bidding history: ot = {x, ht}. At
each episode, Player N and S are dealt with hand xN , xS
respectively. Their hands together describe the full state
of the environment s = {xN , xS} ∈ S, which is not fully
observable by either of the two players.
As we are only interested in learning a computerized bid-
ding system through self-play and playing out the game for
every possible contract, given a state s = {xN , xS}, is com-
putationally expensive, we use Double Dummy Analysis
(DDA) (Haglund, 2010) to estimate scores for every possible
contract without actually playing out the game. re(s) is a
vector whose element is a score for a possible contract given
state s. DDA assumes, for a particular deal, one player’s
hand is fully observable by other players and players al-
ways play cards to their best advantage. However, given a
set s = {xN , xS}, the distribution of remaining cards for
other two non-bidding players Player W and Player E is
still unknown. To reduce the variance of the estimate, we
repeatedly sample a deal U times by allocating the remain-
ing cards randomly to Player W and E N times and estimate
re(s) by taking the average of their DDA scores,
re(s) =
1
U
U∑
u=1
re(x
N , xS , xEu , x
W
u ), (13)
where xEu , x
W
u are hands for Player W and E from u-th
sampling respectively. For a specific contract at, the corre-
sponding score is given by re(at|s) = re(xN , xS , at).
To show non-competitive bidding is still an appropriate
problem for testing PBL, we investigate 1.5 million episodes.
We find that the optimal contract (contract which gives the
highest reward with lowest risk given a deal) is often (92%)
Level 1 (1♣, 1♦, 1♥, 1♠, 1NT ), sometimes (8%) Level 6
or 7 and crucially never the ”mid-level” contracts in between.
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Bidding, and successfully making Level 6-7 contracts yield
a much higher reward than other contracts, due to the ”slam
bonus”. The non-competitive game is therefore interesting
because players must learn to sometimes bid for non-optimal
contracts at risks in order to exchange information with
their partner. Competitive bidding is much more complex
and need not only a communication strategy with partners
but also skills such as hiding information from opponents,
disturbing opponent teams communication by actions and
other playing strategies which will be our future work.
To note, Double is only a valid bid in response to a con-
tract proposed by one’s opponents. Also, a Redouble bid
must be preceded by a Double bid. In the non-competitive
game, opponents do not propose contracts, so these options
are naturally not included. Playing and scoring rules are
summarized in Appendix C.
4.3. Evaluation
To demonstrate PBL’s performance, we compare it with the
following four baselines:
1. Independent Player (IP): A simple baseline is where a
player bids independently without any consideration of the
existence of the other player.
2. No communication reward (NCR): One important
question to ask is how beneficial of the additional commu-
nication auxiliary reward rc is in terms of learning a good
bidding strategy because this additional reward effectively
changes the problem being solved. We implement this base-
line by using the same architecture and training schedule
as PBL but setting weight associated with communication
reward to zero, α = 0.
3. No PBL style iteration (NPBI): To demonstrate multi-
ple iterations between policy and belief training helps, we
compare our model to a baseline where a policy is trained
with the same number of weight updates as our model but
no further PBL iterations being carried out after training a
belief network Φ0 at PBL iteration v = 0.
4. Penetrative Q-Learning (PQL): Yeh and Lin (2016)
proposed a penetrative Q learning algorithm to first time
learn a bidding policy in non-competitive bidding without
human domain knowledge. However, as they learn a Q net-
work at each time step, they have to pre-define the maximum
number of bids in an episode, which makes the model diffi-
cult to generalize to other problems and less scalable. Addi-
tionally, they supervised Q networks with relative rewards
(how relatively good one action is to other actions given a
state) instead of absolute ones. At each time step t within
one episode, each Q network is supervised by re(at|s) rather
than re(aT |s), which implies they could do trials and er-
rors several times within one episode. These tricks give
them a large advantage in winning the game by leaking
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Figure 2. Average scores of PBL and four baselines on 30K test
dataset over 6 training runs.
crucial information to a policy without the need of good
exploration.
Fig 2 shows the average learning curves of our model and
four baselines on the pre-generated test dataset containing
30K pairs of hands over 6 training runs. As can been seen,
IP and NCR both learn faster than our model initially. This
is reasonable as PBL spends more time learning a communi-
cation protocol at first. However, PBL starts to outperform
those baselines from PBL iteration v = 3. IP converges to
a local optimum very quickly. NCR learns a better bidding
strategy than IP because of using a belief module. However,
NCR learns slower and less stably compared to PBL because
it has no guidance on how to convey information to its part-
ner. We also observe that only NCR drops in performance in
the first few policy gradient iterations. As neither IP which
does not have a belief module nor PBL which has a belief
module and the guidance of communication decreases in
the performance, the drop in NCR’s performance could be
related to the fact that NCR is disturbed by ”noise” from its
belief network due to lack of guidance in how to interpret
action history. NPBI also outperforms IP and NCR but it
learns slower in the later stage of training and converged
to a worse optimum compared to PBL, which shows the
importance of iterative training between policy and belief
modules. We evaluate the best version of PQL on our test
dataset and show our model can outperform it. PBL im-
proves from IP the most (7.9%) compared to other models
above the IP baseline. (PQL with unfair advantages comes
to the second with improvement rate 5.9%.) Training details
are included in Appendix D.
We also observe PBL never decreases across different PBL
iterations, which empirically shows its non-decreasing prop-
erty of EM approximation. The fluctuation within one PBL
iteration comes from the policy gradient. We have 8 PBL
iterations shown in Fig 2 and every 1 PBL iteration contains
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100 policy gradient iterations. All baseline models have the
same number of policy gradient iterations as PBL.
Optimal PBL NPBI NCR PQL IP
21.53% 18.29% 16.45% 22.30% 20.97% 22.93%
Table 1. Double Pass rates.
4.4. Double Pass Analysis
At the beginning of bidding, when two players both bid
Pass (Double Pass), all players’ hands are re-dealt and a
new episode starts. If we ignore these episodes in train-
ing, a naive strategy emerges where a player always bids
Pass unless it is highly confident about its hand and there-
fore bids at level 1 whose risk is at the minimum. In this
work, we are interested in solving problems where private
information needs to be inferred from observed actions for
better performance in a game. Therefore, this strategy is
less meaningful and the opportunity cost of bidding Pass
could be high when a player could have won the game with
high reward. To reflect this opportunity cost in training, we
set the reward for Double Pass as: rdp(s) = −max(re(s)).
Therefore, a player will be penalized heavily by bidding
Pass if it could have obtained a high reward otherwise and
awarded slightly if he could never win in the current episode.
Table 1 shows Double Pass rates of PBL and other baselines
on the unseen 30K deals. The optimal rate is the percentage
of deals whose rewards are all negative thus Double Pass
will be awarded. As expected, only PBL and NPBI have a
lower Double Pass rates than the optimal one as they are
explicitly encouraged to communicate during the game. It is
worthy of noting that Pass can also convey information, but
information exchanged by bidding Double Pass is relatively
limited.
4.5. Learned Bidding Convention
Human bridge players decide which bids to make by fol-
lowing a set of rules, more commonly known as the bidding
system or bidding convention. Because there are many
(6×1011) possible hands, it is infeasible to define a specific
rule for each possible situation; as a result humans have
developed summary statistics to quickly assess the strength
of a given hand and defined bidding rules on top of these.
The most commonly used summary statistic measures the
high card points (HCPs) for each suit, such that each card is
given a point score. The specific mapping can vary between
players, but by far the most frequently used is: A=4, K=3,
Q=2, J=1, else=0. The total number of HCPs in a full deck
is 40 and so the expected number of HCPs in a given hand
is 10.
Whilst our model’s bidding decisions are based entirely on
raw card data, we can use high card points as a simple way to
observe and summarize the decisions which are being made.
We run the model on the unseen test set of 30,000 deals and
summarize the learned bidding convention in Appendix E.2.
We hand-craft 24 features using human expert knowledge
(such as HCPs per suit, cards per suit and whether or not
a hand is balanced) and train a decision tree classifier to
predict our model’s opening bid for a given hand’s feature
vector. The most important features (with their respective
feature importance in brackets) are found to be: total HCP
(0.24), count ♥ (0.19), count ♠ (0.18), count ♦ (0.13) and
count ♣(0.12). This is consistent with the primary features
used in human bidding conventions. At depth 14, the deci-
sion tree can correctly predict opening bids (in an unseen
test set) with 88% accuracy, whereas if the depth is reduced
to 3, accuracy falls to 56%. This highlights the limitations
in relying on human bidding systems (which normally con-
sider 2-3 features and rely upon summary statistics) when
aiming to build super-human level bridge AIs.
In our analysis of the non-competitive bridge bidding prob-
lem, we showed that the optimal contracts are often at levels
1-2 (92% of deals) and sometimes at levels 6-7 (8% of deals).
Despite the fact that the level 3-5 contracts can sometimes
have equal reward to those of level 1 and 2, their risk is
often far higher. Also, any time that a level 3-5 contract
can be made, its level 1-2 counterparts can be made, but for
the same reward. There is, therefore, no benefit to bidding
at levels 3-5 except to convey information to ones partner.
Our model frequently uses level 3 bids to convey informa-
tion and in the Appendix we demonstrate some example
trajectories for which this strategy is used. We observe that
a level 3 bid is used by a player with a reasonably strong
hand, who is unsure whether or not a level 6 contract is
obtainable. Their partner responds with a level 6 bid if they
have a strong hand and PASS otherwise. Some interesting
examples are included in Appendix E.3.
5. Discussion
In this paper, we have proposed PBL, a novel approach
combines agent modeling and communication to solve col-
laborative imperfect information games. PBL is an approxi-
mation of an exact algorithm P-BIT which has convergence
proof. We iterate between training a policy module and a
belief module to improve the performance of an agent in a
game. We also introduced a novel auxiliary reward which
encourages an agent to take actions which can convey criti-
cal information to its partner. This auxiliary reward is shown
by experimental results that it can guide collaborators in
imperfect information games to communicate. We evalu-
ate our model on non-competitive bridge bidding problem,
where a non-verbal communication protocol is essential to
succeed in the game. We demonstrate PBL’s performance
by comparing it with meaningful baselines and we also
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show PBL can outperform a previous work which is heavily
adapted to non-competitive bridge bidding problem. PBL
is the first work to our knowledge which learns an implicit
communication protocol by reinforcement learning.
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A. Policy Belief Iteration Algorithm
Algorithm 1 Policy Belief Iteration (PBL)
pi0 = initial policy(){initialize}
pi0 = train naive(){train the first policy naively}
Φ0 = initial belief(){initialize belief module}
for i = 0 to max iterations do
Ωi = sample from selfplay(pii){sample episodes for belief training}
Φi = train belief(Ωi){train belief module on Ωi}
pii+1 = pg(Φi){train policy given the belief module}
end for
B. A Variantional Lower Bound
In this section, we present the derivation of the variational lower bound defined in Eq. 3. First, we can factorize
P (E1:T , a
i
1:T , a
−i
1:T , s1:T , x
i, x−i) as:
P (E1:T , a
i
1:T , a
−i
1:T , s1:T , x
i
1:T , x
−i
1:T |pi)
= P (s1)
∏
t
P (st+1|st, ait, a−it )P (Et|st, ait, a−it )P (ait|st, xi, x−i)P (a−it |st, xi, x−i)P (xit|st)P (x−it |st)
, = P (s1)
∏
t
P (st+1|st, ait, a−it )P (Et|st, ait, a−it )pi(ait|st, xi, x−i)pi(a−it |st, xi, x−i)P (xit|st)P (x−it |st) (14)
where we assume the optimality Et is only dependent on (st, ait, a
−i
t ) and the constant hidden information of different
agents is conditionally independent given the state st: P (xi, x−i|st) = P (xit|st)P (x−it |st).
Similarly, we can factorize the variational distribution q(ai1:T , a
−i
1:T , s1:T , x
i
1:T , x
−i
1:T |h1:T ) as:
q(ai1:T , a
−i
1:T , s1:T , x
i
1:T , x
−i
1:T |h1:T )
= P (s1)
∏
t
P (st+1|st, ait, a−it )P (ait|st, xit, x−it )q(x−it |ht)P (a−it |st, xit, x−it )q(xit|ht)
= P (s1)
∏
t
P (st+1|st, ait, a−it )pii(ait|st, xit, x−it )Φi(x−it |ht)pi−i(a−it |st, xit, x−it )Φ−i(xit|ht). (15)
As we assume xi is only observable to agent i and we take the centralised training approach, we treat pii(ait|st, xit, x−it ) and
pi−i(a−it |st, xit, x−it ) as the same function with different inputs. In agent i’s policy pii(ait|st, xit, x−it ), xit is known but x−it
is estimated from its opponent model Φi(x−it |ht) and vice versa for agent −i.
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With these factorizations, we have
L(pi) = logP (E1:T |pi)
= log
∑
xi,x−i,ai,a−i
P (E1:T , a
i
1:T , a
−i
1:T , s1:T , x
i
1:T , x
−i
1:T )
≥
∑
xi,x−i,ai,a−i
q(ai1:T , a
−i
1:T , s1:T , x
i
1:T , x
−i
1:T |h1:T )log
P (E1:T , a
i
1:T , a
−i
1:T , s1:T , x
i
1:T , x
−i
1:T )
q(xi1:T , x
−i
1:T |h1:T )
= Eρs,pi,Φ[
XXXXlogP (s1) +
XXXXXXXXXXX
∑
t
logP (st+1|st, ait, a−it ) +
∑
t
logP (Et|st, ait, a−it ) +
XXXXXXXXXX
∑
t
logpi(ait|st, xit, x−it )
+
XXXXXXXXXXX
∑
t
logpi(a−it |st, xit, x−it ) −XXXXlogP (s1) −
XXXXXXXXXXX
∑
t
logP (st+1|st, ait, a−it ) −
XXXXXXXXXX
∑
t
logpi(ait|st, xit, x−it )
−
XXXXXXXXXXX
∑
t
logpi(a−it |st, xit, x−it ) −
∑
t
log
Φi(x−it |ht)
P (x−it |st)
−
∑
t
log
Φ−i(xit|ht)
P (xit|st)
]
=
∑
t
Eρs,pi,Φ[r(st, ait, a
−i
t )−DKL(Φi(x−it |ht)||P (x−it |st))−DKL(Φ−i(xit|ht)||P (xit|st))]. (16)
B.1. The Convergence of P-BIT
For conciseness, we use capital letters without any subscripts and superscripts to represent the set of corresponding variable
over time across different agents, e.g. we write E = {E1:T } and A = {ai1:T , a−i1:T }. Then we can re-express L(θ) as:
L(θ) = logP (E|θ)
= log
∑
S,A,X
P (E,S,A,X|θ)
≥∆= F(θ, q)
=
∑
S,A,X
q(S,A,X|H)logP (E,S,A,X|θ)
q(S,A,X|H)
=< logP (E,S,A,X|θ) >q(S,A,X|H) −H(q) (17)
= L(θ)−DKL(q(S,A,X|H)||P (S,A,X|E, θ)). (18)
In Belief Iteration, we optimize q with respect to F(θ, q) holding θ fixed:
qv(S,A,X|H) = P (S,A,X|E, θv−1). (19)
In Policy Iteration (M-step), we maximize F(θ, q) with respect to θ holding q fixed:
θv = arg max
θ
F(θ, q) = arg max
θ
< logP (E,S,A,X|θ) >qv(S,A,X|H) . (20)
Note, the above Policy Belief Iteration can be recovered to the ones defined in Eq. 5 and 6 by having the following
factorizations and expand distributions over time:
P (S,A,X|θ) = ρS × pi(θ)× P (X)
q(S,A,X|H) = ρS × pi × Φ. (21)
If θ∗ is a fixed point in P-BIT, then:
∂
∂θ
< logP (E,S,A,X|θ) >P (S,A,X|E,θ∗) |θ∗ = 0. (22)
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For L(θ) we can show:
L(θ) = logP (E|θ)
=< logP (E|θ) >P (S,A,X|E,θ∗)
=< log
P (E,S,A,X|θ)
P (S,A,X|E, θ) >P (S,A,X|E,θ∗)
=< logP (E,S,A,X|θ) >P (S,A,X|E,θ∗) − < logP (S,A,X|E, θ) >P (S,A,X|E,θ∗) . (23)
Then, if we take derivative of L(θ) with respect to θ and evaluate the derivative at θ∗, we can have:
d
dθ
L(θ)|θ∗ = d
dθ
< logP (E,S,A,X|θ) >P (S,A,X|E,θ∗) |θ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by Eq.22
− d
dθ
< logP (S,A,X|E, θ) >P (S,A,X|E,θ∗) |θ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 if the derivate exists, this is KL-divergence of the same dirstribution
= 0, (24)
which proves Lemma 1.
If θ∗ is a (local) maximum in F(θ, q), by taking the second derivative of of L(θ) with respect to θ, we have:
d2
dθ2
L(θ)|θ∗ = d
2
dθ2
< logP (E,S,A,X|θ) >P (S,A,X|E,θ∗) |θ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0, as F is at a (local) maximum
− d
2
dθ2
< logP (S,A,X|E, θ) >P (S,A,X|E,θ∗) |θ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 as KL divergence is at minimum whenDKL(·||·) = 0
< 0︸︷︷︸
negative minus positive
. (25)
Therefore, L(θ∗) is also at maximum, which proves Theorem 1.
C. Bridge
C.1. Playing Phase in Bridge
After the final contract being decided, the player from the declaring side who first bid the trump suit named in the final
contract becomes Declarer. Declarer’s partner is Dummy. The player left to the declarer becomes the first Leading player.
Then Dummy lays his cards face up on the table and then play proceeds clockwise. On each trick, the Leading player shows
one card from its hand and other players need to play the same suit as leading player’s if possible otherwise it can play a
card from another suit. Trump suit is superior to other suits and, within a suit, a higher rank card is superior to lower rank
one. A trick is won by the player who plays the card with the highest priority and this player becomes Leading player for the
next trick.
C.2. Score
Algorithm 2 shows how to score a game. We obtain the tricks made by using Double Dummy Analysis(Haglund, 2010)
for a certain deal {x1, x2, xW , xE} which specifies the hands of all players, the declarer, the trump suit. The score function
above has a scale and bias for each trump suit. The scale is 20 for ♣ and ♦ and 30 for all others. Bias is zero for all trumps,
except NT which has a bias of 10.
D. Experiment Details in Bridge
D.1. Offline Environment
Generating a new pair of hands for Player N and S and pre-calculate scores for every possible contract at the start of a new
episode during policy training is time inefficient. Instead, we pre-generate 1.5 million hands and scored them in advance.
Then we sample new episodes from this dataset when we train a policy. Also, we generated a separate test dataset containing
30K hands for testing our models.
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Algorithm 2 Scoring a Bridge game
Score (tricks made, bid level, trump suit)
T ← trump suit
δ ← tricks made− (bid level + 6)
score← 0
if δ ≥ 0 then
score← score+ bid level ∗ scaleT + biasT {Contract tricks}
if δ = 6 then
score← score+ 500 {Slam bonus}
else if δ = 7 then
score← score+ 1000 {Grand Slam bonus}
end if
if δ > 0 then
score← score+ δ ∗ scaleT {Contract tricks}
end if
else
score← score− bid level ∗ 50 {Under-tricks}
end if
Player North
Player South
hN FCb
+
xS
bS!SFCpaS E
hSFCb
+
xN
bN
!N FCp aN
ɸθb
πθpπθp
ɸθb
Figure 3. The architecture of our Policy Network and Belief Network in bridge. E represents environment and FC stands for fully
connected layers. For player i, we add their private information xi and belief bs together to form ηi as the input to its policy network pi.
Player i′s action ai becomes part of player j’s history hj , which is the input to Player j’s belief network Φ.
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D.2. Model Architecture
We parameterize policy and belief modules with two neural networks piθp and Φθb respectively. Fig. 3 shows our model in
bridge. Weights of belief and policy modules are shared between players respectively. The input to a player’s policy piθp is
the sum of its private information x and belief b. The last layer’s non-linear activation function of the belief module Φ is
Sigmoid, so the belief vector b scales between [0, 1]. By adding belief b to x, we could reuse parameters associated with x
for b and avoid training of extra parameters.
D.3. Pre-train Policy
In the first PBL iteration v = 0, to have a good initial starting policy and avoid an over deterministic one, we train our policy
to predict a distribution converted from using Softmax on re(s) with temperature τ . The loss for pre-train policy given s is:
Lv0 = DKL(pi(a|x)|Softmax(re(s), τ)),
where DKL is the KL-Divergence. To have a fair comparison with other benchmarks, all our benchmarks also initialize with
this pre-trained policy. Supervising a bidding policy to predict pre-calculated scores for all actions only makes the policy to
have a basic understanding of its hand. However, this does not give the policy great advantage for solving the whole problem
as the policy only has the access to one player’s hand x and the accuracy of predicting the optimal contract is only 39.23%.
D.4. Policy Training
We utilize PPO (Schulman et al., 2017) algorithm in our task. Optimization is performed with the Adam optimizer(Kingma
& Ba, 2014) with beta1 = 0.9, beta2 = 0.999, epsilon = 10−8. The start learning rate is 10−4. We do exponential decay on
learning rate with decaying rate = 0.95 and decaying step = 50.
The distance used in communication rewards rc is cross entropy and we treat each dimension of belief and ground truth as
an independent Bernoulli distribution.
We train PBL with 8 PBL iterations, we do policy gradient 100 times per iteration and we sample 5000 episodes each time.
The batch size is 2048. The initial communication weight α is 5, and we decrease it by 1 every two PBL iterations. We train
all other baselines with same times of policy gradient in total.
D.5. Learning A Belief Network
When a player tries to model its partner’s hand based on observed bidding history, we assume it can omit the restriction that
its partner can only hold 13 cards. Therefore, we take the prediction of the partner’s hand given the observed bidding history
as a 52-label classification problem, where each label represents one corresponding card being in the partner’s hand. In other
words, we treat each card from a 52-card deck being in the partner’s hand as an independent Bernoulli distribution and we
train a belief network by maximizing the joint likelihood of these 52 Bernoulli distributions given a bidding history h. This
gives the loss for belief network as:
LΦ = −
52∑
i=1
x−ilog(bi) + (1− x−i)log(1− bi),
where x−i and bi are elements of one-hot encoding vectors of a partner’s hand x−i and one agent’s belief bi. The reasoning
behind this assumption is we think it is more important to have a more accurate prediction over an invalid distribution than a
less accurate one over a valid distribution and belief itself is already an approximation.
For each belief training, we generated 300,000 data episodes with the current policy to train the belief network.Optimization
is performed with the Adam optimizer with beta1 = 0.9, beta2 = 0.999, epsilon = 10−8 and decay = 0.95. The start
learning rate is 10−3. The batch size is 1024. We do early stopping for training belief network.
D.6. Equal Pass
As done similarly in (Yeh & Lin, 2016), when the bidding level reaches to 6, the bidding can be terminated by a player
(North or South) bidding the same contract as the previous one Equal Pass (for example, 6♠ and 6♠) or PASS. This makes
the bidding relatively easier and we see improvement in PBL’s average score on the test data set. However, this heuristic
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Figure 4. Updating belief through an episode
technique does not make our contribution trivial. We also train a PBL player over 6 run where Equal Pass disabled and show
that it can still outperforms PQL player (Equal Pass enabled) in (Yeh & Lin, 2016) (0.04322 vs 0.04308) with a smaller
margin.
E. Learned Opponent Model and Bidding Convention
E.1. Belief
In Fig. 4, we show how each player’s belief (blue) is updated throughout an episode. This is compared against the ground
truth (red). Cards are represented lowest to highest for each suit (i.e. 2♠, 3♠, ..., K♠, A♠). We show the corresponding
communication rewards rc below:
North bid: 1♦— rc = 0.008051, South bid: 1N — rc = 0.014776,
North bid: 2♠, — rc = 0.002844, South bid: 2N — rc = 0.012684,
North bid: 3♣— rc = −0.000959, South bid: 6♣— rc = −0.000561,
North bid: 6♦— rc = 0.004513, South bid: 6N — rc = 0.006034,
North bid: PASS — rc = 0.000000.
As an example for how to interpret this figure: see that after North bids 1♦, South’s belief that North holds diamonds
(especially high value diamonds) increases. Similarly when North bids 2♠, South believes that North also holds spades.
E.2. High Card Points Tables
Table 2 shows the average HCPs (aHCPs) present in a hand for each of the opening bidding decisions made by NORTH.
Once an opening bid is observed, SOUTH updates their belief; Table 3 shows the effect which each oppening bid has
on SOUTH’s belief. We show in Table 4 the responding bidding decisions made by SOUTH; aHCP values here are the
summation of HCPs in SOUTH’s hand and HCPs in SOUTH’s belief of NORTH’s hand.
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Bid ♣ ♦ ♥ ♠ Total
PASS 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 5.6
1♣ 4.7 1.9 1.9 2.0 10.5
1♦ 2.0 4.8 1.9 2.0 10.7
1♥ 2.3 2.3 4.8 2.2 12.0
1♠ 2.2 2.3 2.2 4.8 11.5
1NT 4.6 4.6 3.7 3.0 15.9
6♣ 7.8 4.0 4.3 7.3 23.4
6♦ 4.0 7.8 4.6 6.4 22.8
6♥ 4.5 5.7 6.9 6.4 23.5
6♠ 6.7 3.0 5.8 8.8 24.3
Table 2. Opening bid - own aHCPs.
Bid ♣ ♦ ♥ ♠ Total
PASS 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 5.8
1♣ 4.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 10.6
1♦ 2.0 4.9 1.8 2.0 10.7
1♥ 2.2 2.3 4.8 2.1 11.4
1♠ 2.3 2.2 2.2 4.8 11.5
1NT 4.6 4.6 3.8 2.9 15.9
6♣ 7.3 3.8 4.1 5.0 20.2
6♦ 3.7 7.3 4.8 5.2 21.0
6♥ 4.5 4.9 7.1 5.4 21.9
6♠ 4.6 5.1 5.0 7.3 22.0
Table 3. Belief HCPs after observing open-
ing bid.
Bid ♣ ♦ ♥ ♠ Total
PASS 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.4 16.5
1♣ 7.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 19.3
1♦ 4.7 7.3 4.0 4.0 20.0
1♥ 4.8 4.9 7.2 4.1 21.0
1♠ 4.7 4.8 4.8 7.2 21.5
1NT 6.9 6.8 6.0 5.2 24.9
2♣ 7.5 4.5 4.4 4.2 20.5
2♦ 4.3 7.5 4.4 4.4 20.6
2♥ 4.8 4.8 7.7 4.8 22.1
2♠ 5.4 5.5 5.2 8.6 24.7
2NT 7.8 7.7 6.9 6.6 29.0
6♣ 9.2 6.4 6.9 7.8 30.3
6♦ 6.8 10.0 6.8 7.0 30.6
6♥ 7.2 6.5 9.8 7.3 30.8
6♠ 6.9 7.0 6.7 10.1 30.7
6NT 8.7 9.0 7.8 8.7 34.2
Table 4. Responding bid - own + belief
aHCPs.
E.3. Interesting Bidding Examples
==================== EXAMPLE 1: ====================
NORTH:
♠ Q764
♥ A9
♦ 975
♣ QJ85
SOUTH:
♠ A32
♥ JT74
♦ AK
♣ AK94
BIDS: PASS, 1NT, 2NT, 3♥, PASS
REWARD: 0.012
North has 9 HCPs and bids PASS for the opening bid. South bids 1NT, which indicates that they have a strong hand in all
suits (19 HCP total). With the new knowledge of Souths hand, North chooses to raise the bidding level as opposed to the
PASS bid that an agent with no belief would make.
==================== EXAMPLE 2: ====================
NORTH:
♠ 98
♥ 7654
♦ J8742
♣ 54
SOUTH:
♠ 4
♥ AKQ
♦ AK63
♣ AKJT3
BIDS: PASS, 1NT, 2♦, 6♦, PASS
REWARD: 0.220
A more extreme version of Example 1. North (1 HCP), South (24 HCP). A level 6 contract is successfully reached.
==================== EXAMPLE 3: ====================
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NORTH:
♠ Q876
♥ Q3
♦ J43
♣ AJ94
SOUTH:
♠ 2
♥ KJ982
♦ AK92
♣ T53
BIDS: PASS, 1♥, 1NT, 2♦, PASS
REWARD: 0.018
Both players with average-strength hands (10 HCPs for North, 11 HCPs for SOUTH).
==================== EXAMPLE 4: ====================
NORTH:
♠ J852
♥ T932
♦ T8
♣ 952
SOUTH:
♠ KQT
♥ AK8765
♦ A732
♣
BIDS: PASS, 1♥, PASS
REWARD: 0.1166
North has 1 HCP and opens with PASS. Despite South having a strong hand (16 HCPs) and responding with ♥, North ends
the bidding at level 1. This is the optimal contract in this case.
==================== EXAMPLE 5: ====================
NORTH:
♠ AJT985
♥ QT83
♦ 96
♣ 5
SOUTH:
♠ Q
♥ KJ2
♦ QJT732
♣ A98
BIDS: 1♠, 1NT, 2♥, PASS
REWARD: 0.0297
7 HCPs for North, 12 for South. 50 Monte Carlo simulations using double dummy analysis calculate the optimal contract
here to be 1♠.
==================== EXAMPLE 6: ====================
NORTH:
♠ AKJ64
♥ K32
♦ 84
♣ QJ5
SOUTH:
♠ T32
♥
♦ AQJ965
♣ AK32
BIDS: 1♠, 2♠, 3♠, 6♦, 6♠, PASS
REWARD: 0.384
Each have 14 HCPs. North has strong ♠ (7 HCPs) and South has strong ♦ and ♣ (7 HCPs in each).
==================== EXAMPLE 7: ====================
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NORTH:
♠ AKQJ87632
♥
♦ 76
♣ 72
SOUTH:
♠ 95
♥ T
♦ AKJT83
♣ QJ95
BIDS: 1♠, 2♦, 2♠, 3♠, PASS
REWARD: 0.123
South uses the 3♠ bid to communicate. However, North declines. North has 10 HCPs and South has 11 HCPs. See Example 8.
==================== EXAMPLE 8: ====================
NORTH:
♠ AKJ73
♥ AK
♦ T4
♣ A532
SOUTH:
♠ Q4
♥ QT6
♦ KQJ9762
♣ K
BIDS: 1♠, 2♦, 2♠, 3♠, 6♠, PASS
REWARD: 0.384
South uses the 3♠ bid to communicate. In contrast to Example 7, North accepts and bid 6♠, because North has relatively
stronger cards (13 HCPs) compared to Example 3.
==================== EXAMPLE 9: ====================
NORTH:
♠ Q64
♥ AJ83
♦ T5
♣ QJT3
SOUTH:
♠ AK85
♥ Q4
♦ K6
♣ A9652
BIDS: 1♥, 1NT, 2♣, 3♣, PASS
REWARD: 0.073
North has 10 HCPs and South has 16 HCPs. Level 3 contract is reached, compare to Example 10.
==================== EXAMPLE 10: ====================
NORTH:
♠ 5
♥ QJ752
♦ AKQ
♣ T832
SOUTH:
♠ 743
♥ A8
♦ 87
♣ AKQJ96
BIDS: 1♥, 1NT, 2♣, 3♣, 6♣, PASS
REWARD: 0.485
Same total HCPs as Example 9, but more evenly distributed (North (12 HCPs), South (14 HCPs)). Initially, North has better
cards in ♥, than ♣, so he opens the bidding with 1♥. However, as the game plays and by communication, North realized it
would be better to bid 6♣ because North and South, as a team, have stronger cards in ♣ than ♥.
